

UNCLASSIFIED

E196

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 ACCRA 05339 01 OF 02 231804Z
ACTION AF-01

RELEASED IN FULL

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	AID-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DOEE-00	EB-01
	EUR-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	JUSE-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01
	PM-00	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00
	STR-01	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	DTC-01	PMB-00	PRME-01
	DRL-09	G-01	/059W				

-----553C5D 231805Z /38

O 231758Z JUN 94
FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1485
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
USCINCEUR ECJ4 VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4-SA// IMMEDIATE
USDAO ABIDJAN IV IMMEDIATE
JCS WASHDC//J5-MEAF// IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ACCRA 005339

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, MASS, PREL, PHUM, UNSC, RW, FR, GH
SUBJECT: GOG EXPRESSES CONCERN FOR SAFETY OF GHANAIA
TROOPS STILL IN RWANDA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ACCRA 05339 01 OF 02 231804Z
REF: A) ACCRA 5288; B) USUN NEW YORK 2589; C) SECSTATE
167690; D) SECSTATE 166974; E) PARIS 17205

1. CONFIDENTIAL (ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ACTION REQUESTED PARA 13.

3. SUMMARY: ON JUNE 23, MINISTER FOR DEFENSE ALHAJI
MAHAMA IDDRISU CONVOKED CHARGE TO EXPRESS SERIOUS GOG
CONCERN, IN LIGHT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION TO
SUPPORT THE FRENCH INITIATIVE, FOR THE SAFETY OF THE 350

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

GHANAIA TROOPS STILL IN RWANDA AS PART OF UNAMIR. IDDRISU AND CHIEF OF DEFENSE STAFF (CJCS EQUIVALENT) SAID THE RPF HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WOULD NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SAFETY OF UNAMIR IF FRENCH SENT TROOPS INTO RWANDA. THIS HAD PROMPTED THE GOG TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO WITHDRAWING ITS TROOPS. HOWEVER, BOTH MEN MADE IMPASSIONED STATEMENTS THAT GHANA DID NOT WANT TO WITHDRAW FROM RWANDA; WOULD NOT WITHDRAW UNILATERALLY BUT ONLY ON COMMAND OF UN FORCES COMMANDER; AND HAD ALREADY PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN SAVING LIVES. THEY POINTED OUT THAT HAVING TWO FOREIGN FORCES IN RWANDA, EACH UNDER DIFFERENT COMMAND, WOULD CREATE PROBLEMS EVEN WITHOUT THE RPF HOSTILITY. THEY SAID GHANAIA TROOPS HAD NO SAFE TRANSPORT AND WERE ILL-EQUIPPED. THEY HAD BEEN DEPENDING FOR THEIR SAFETY ON BOTH FACTIONS' RESPECT FOR THEIR NEUTRALITY AND HUMANITARIAN MISSION. THE UN DECISION, IN THEIR OPINION, PUTS THEIR MEN AT SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER RISK. END SUMMARY

4. ON JUNE 23, MINISTER FOR DEFENSE IDDRISU TOLD CHARGE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 ACCRA 05339 01 OF 02 231804Z
THAT THE RPF HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WOULD NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY OF REMAINING UNAMIR TROOPS IF THE FRENCH DEPLOYED TROOPS TO RWANDA. IDDRISU BELIEVES THE RPF, IN ITS DESIRE TO EMBARRASS THE FRENCH AND THE UN AND PRESSURE THEM TO DESIST, WILL NOT CARE WHO GETS HURT. CHIEF OF DEFENSE STAFF AIR MARSHAL DUMASHIE SAID THE GHANAIA CONTINGENT STILL HAS CREDIBILITY AS A NEUTRAL FORCE, BUT THE RPF MIGHT NOT CARE, OR BE ABLE, TO MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE REMAINING UNAMIR FORCES AND THE FRENCH DEPLOYMENT. HE NOTED THAT DEPUTY UNAMIR COMMANDER BRIGADIER ANYIDHOH HAD TO ESCORT FRANCOPHONE UN MILITARY OBSERVERS OUT OF RWANDA. IDDRISU AND DUMASHIE CLEARLY BELIEVE THAT THE UN DECISION TO SUPPORT THE FRENCH INTERVENTION HAS SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED THE RISK FACING THE GHANAIA UNAMIR CONTINGENT.

5. IDDRISU ASKED WHAT DETAILS WE COULD SUPPLY ON THE UNSC RESOLUTION. CHARGE SUMMARIZED THE RESOLUTION AND SENT A COPY TO THE MINISTER LATER.

6. CHARGE EXPLAINED REASONS FOR U.S. SUPPORT FOR FRENCH INITIATIVE. HE ALSO ASSURED IDDRISU AND DUMASHIE THAT THE U.S., THE UN, AND FRENCH WERE OPENING ALL POSSIBLE

UNCLASSIFIED

CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION TO THE FACTIONS IN RWANDA AND
URGING THEM TO RESPECT THE HUMANITARIAN MISSION OF THE
FRENCH DEPLOYMENT. CHARGE ALSO ASKED IDDRISU TO TELL
PRESIDENT RAWLINGS OF THE U.S. APPRECIATION FOR GHANAIA
EFFORTS IN RWANDA. IDDRISU AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT
TO STOP THE KILLING. DUMASHIE ALSO AGREED BUT POINTED
OUT THAT THERE HAD BEEN A LULL IN THE KILLING THIS WEEK

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 ACCRA 05339 01 OF 02 231804Z
AND THAT THE MERE THREAT OF IMMINENT INTERNATIONAL
ACTION MIGHT HAVE BEEN ENOUGH TO PREVENT A RESURGENCE OF
THE ATROCITIES. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE RESOURCES USED TO
EQUIP THE FRENCH INTERVENTION COULD HAVE BEEN USED TO
EQUIP AN EXPANDED UNAMIR. HE SAID THAT GHANA COULD
DEPLOY ITS FULL BATTALION AS SOON AS IT RECEIVED THE
NECESSARY LOGISTIC SUPPORT (REF A).

7. CHARGE ASKED IF GHANA HAD ANY LINES OPEN TO THE RPF.
DUMASHIE REPLIED THAT D
EPUTY UNAMIR FORCE COMMANDER
BRIGADIER ANYIDHO CHAIRS CEASEFIRE MEETINGS BETWEEN THE
TWO FACTIONS IN RWANDA. OTHER THAN THAT, HOWEVER, THE
GOG HAS NO REGULAR CHANNEL FOR COMMUNICATION WITH THE
RPF. CHARGE ASKED IF OAU COULD PLAY A ROLE, PERHAPS
PASS MESSAGES TO RPF. IDDRISU SAID THAT WOULD BE
DIFFICULT.

8. IDDRISU AND DUMASHIE SAID THEY HAD REASONABLY GOOD
COMMUNICATION WITH THEIR FORCES. HOWEVER, IDDRISU SAID
THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEND A TEAM OF 2-4 SENIOR OFFICERS
TO RWANDA TO OBSERVE CONDITIONS ON THE GROUND. DUMASHIE
POINTED OUT THAT THIS WOULD NOT ONLY PROVIDE A CLEARER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 ACCRA 05339 02 OF 02 231805Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	AID-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DOEE-00	EB-01
	EUR-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	JUSE-00	LAB-01
	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01
	PM-00	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00
	STR-01	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	DTC-01	PMB-00	PRME-01
	DRL-09	G-01	/059W				

-----553C65 231806Z /38

O 231758Z JUN 94
FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1486
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
USCINCEUR ECJ4 VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4-SA// IMMEDIATE
USDAO ABIDJAN IV IMMEDIATE
JCS WASHDC//J5-MEAF// IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ACCRA 005339

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, MASS, PREL, PHUM, UNSC, RW, FR, GH
SUBJECT: GOG EXPRESSES CONCERN FOR SAFETY OF GHANAIAN
TROOPS STILL IN RWANDA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ACCRA 05339 02 OF 02 231805Z
PICTURE FOR THE GOG BUT WOULD BE A REAL MORALE BOOST TO
THE GHANAIAN TROOPS IN RWANDA. IDDRISU ASKED WHETHER
THE U.S. MIGHT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE A PLANE TO FLY THE
GHANAIAN TEAM TO RWANDA. CHARGE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW
WHAT ASSETS MIGHT BE AVAILABLE, BUT HE WOULD ENQUIRE AND
LET IDDRISU KNOW.

9. DUMASHIE POINTED OUT THAT THE OAU HAD HAD
RESERVATIONS CONCERNING THE FRENCH INITIATIVE. THE
PRIMARY OAU FEAR, HE SAID, HAD BEEN CONFLICT BETWEEN
UNAMIR AND THE FORCES UNDER FRENCH COMMAND. DUMASHIE

UNCLASSIFIED

AND IDDRISU SEE THIS AS A LEGITIMATE CONCERN. THEY BELIEVE THAT IT IS UNWISE TO HAVE TWO INTERNATIONAL FORCES OPERATING IN THE SAME AREA UNDER DIFFERENT COMMANDS. THEY EXPLAINED THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO SEND TROOPS WITH THE FRENCH INTERVENTION BECAUSE THEN GHANA WOULD HAVE HAD ITS TROOPS OPERATING UNDER TWO DIFFERENT COMMANDS.

UNCLASSIFIED

10. CHARGE ASKED ABOUT THE SAFETY OF GHANAIA TROOPS, ESPECIALLY WHAT SORT OF TRANSPORT THEY HAD. DUMASHIE REPLIED THAT HIS TROOPS WERE ILL-EQUIPPED AND HAD NO SAFE TRANSPORT. HE SAID THAT THE ONLY THING PROTECTING THE GHANAIA SOLDIERS WAS THE FACT THAT THE FACTIONS RESPECTED THE NEUTRALITY OF THE GHANAIA UNAMIR CONTINGENT AND ITS HUMANITARIAN MISSION, BUT THAT THE FRENCH INTERVENTION MIGHT WEAKEN THIS PERCEPTION.

11. IN RESPONSE TO WHETHER, IN LIGHT OF THE PERCEIVED INCREASED DANGER TO GHANAIA TROOPS, THE GOG WAS THINKING OF WITHDRAWING ITS TROOP, DUMASHIE RESPONDED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 ACCRA 05339 02 OF 02 231805Z

THAT THE GOG WAS ACTIVELY CONSIDERING SUCH A WITHDRAWAL IN LIGHT OF THE RPF LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HOWEVER, HE ADDED, THE GOG WOULD NOT WITHDRAW UNILATERALLY. OUR FORCES, HE SAID, ARE UNDER UN COMMAND AND WOULD ONLY WITHDRAW IF SO ORDERED BY THE UN FORCE COMMANDER. HE NOTED THAT THE FRENCH, ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD NEVER PUT THEIR FORCES UNDER UN COMMAND. HE ASKED WHAT WOULD BE THE ROLE OF THE CURRENT UNAMIR COMMANDER ONCE THE FRENCH DEPLOY. HE ALSO WONDERED WHETHER BOTH THE FRENCH AND UNAMIR FORCES WOULD COME UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A CIVILIAN UN OFFICIAL ON THE GROUND IN RWANDA.

12. IDDRISU BECAME QUITE IMPASSIONED IN EXPLAINING THAT GHANA DID NOT WANT TO WITHDRAW. "WE WANT TO BE THERE," HE SAID. "WE HAVE PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN SAVING LIVES AND WE HAVE A CONTINUING ROLE TO PLAY. WE DON'T WANT THE WORLD TO THINK THAT AFRICA IS HELPLESS TO ASSIST IN RESOLVING AFRICAN CONFLICTS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST BE CONCERNED FOR THE SAFETY OF OUR SOLDIERS." HE REITERATED HIS REQUEST FOR U.S. TRANSPORT FOR A TEAM TO VISIT RWANDA.

13. ACTION REQUESTED: WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL

UNCLASSIFIED

IF DEPARTMENT COULD URGE ALL PARTIES TO EMPHASIZE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE RPF THE IMPORTANCE OF TREATING UNAMIR, WHICH WE UNDERSTAND CONSISTS MOSTLY OF GHANAIAAN TROOPS AT THIS TIME, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NEUTRAL, HUMANITARIAN ROLE IT HAS PLAYED. IN ADDITION, WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANSWERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO THE FOLLOWING GHANAIAAN QUESTIONS:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 ACCRA 05339 02 OF 02 231805Z

- HOW WILL COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS BE COORDINATED BETWEEN THE FORCES DEPLOYED UNDER THE FRENCH AND THE CURRENT UNAMIR FORCES?
- WHAT WILL BE THE ROLE OF THE CURRENT UNAMIR COMMANDER ONCE THE FRENCH DEPLOY?
- WILL BOTH THE TROOPS DEPLOYED UNDER FRENCH COMMAND AND UNAMIR COME UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF SOME UN CIVILIAN OFFICIAL IN RWANDA?
- IS ANY U.S. TRANSPORT AVAILABLE TO FLY A GHANAIAAN MILITARY TEAM TO RWANDA FOR CONSULTATION WITH THE GHANAIAAN UNAMIR CONTINGENT?
- WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE FIFTY APC'S THE U.S. IS PROVIDING THROUGH THE UN FOR THE USE OF THE GHANAIAAN CONTINGENT? LEDESMA

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED